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Article
TEACHING PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF
OCTOMOM: ENHANCING CASE/SOCRATIC
METHOD WITH STRUCTURED CLASS
DISCUSSION
Constance Anastopoulo and Thomas P. Gressette, Jr. *
Ann Curry: So you’re saying you have no income coming in?
Nadya Suleman: At the moment, no. 1
The fact that a woman now has the option to create eight embryos
and carry them to term in a single pregnancy is a miracle made possible
only by technology.2 It is quite another matter that a woman with no job
and six children of her own would exercise that option and then rely on
government assistance to financially support all fourteen of her children.
I. INTRODUCTION
As technology empowers individuals to impact community
resources in ways never contemplated by the law, society will have to
address how, or whether, it will protect reproductive freedom when the
exercise of that freedom alters the allocation of community resources.3
Questions about the applicability of current definitions of privacy,
*
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Carolina School of Law.
Adjunct Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law; J.D., University of South
Carolina School of Law; Litigation Attorney, Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman,
LLC, Charleston, S.C. The views expressed in this Article are solely my own and not those
of Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC or any of the firm’s clients.
The Authors would like to thank Sheila Sheuerman (Charleston School of Law) and
William J. Quirk (University of South Carolina School of Law) for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this Article. In addition, we would like to thank Julie Craig, Brian Kern,
Randi Lynn Shelley, and Michael Wright for their research assistance. Errors and
omissions are ours alone. Also, we thank Akim and Hunter without whom this would not
be possible.
1
Interview with Nadya Suleman, NBC Television Broadcast (Feb. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29129311%20/ppage/5/.
2
See The Science Behind Giving Birth To Octuplets, CBS2 LOS ANGELES, Jan. 31, 2009,
http://cbs2.com/health/octuplets.multiple.high.2.923397.html.
3
Steven Edmondson, Eight is Enough! A Constitutional Argument for Regulating Assisted
Reproductive Technology, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER: HEALTH LAW PERSPECTIVES,
Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(SE)%20eight.pdf.
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individuals’ freedom to harness technological advances in reproduction,
and scarcity of resources will refine concepts of personal liberty and will
force Americans to consider which branch of government should define
those liberties.4
None of the three branches of American government will be able to
promulgate rules or laws fast enough to keep up with the questions
posed by advances in areas such as assisted reproduction. Years will
pass as legislators coin phrases like “excessive reproduction”5 and then
finally, after cases have worked through the courts, perhaps judges will
write about issues of “state interest in protecting already born children”
in case law intended to tell the American public how and when private
rights must yield to the rights of others. Americans will need guidance
long before the courts, legislatures, or executive agencies resolve these
issues, and they will turn to tomorrow’s lawyers for answers.
This Article uses the highly publicized story of Nadya Suleman’s
technologically-assisted conception of octuplets to illustrate the need for
new ways to teach privacy to law students. Traditional case/Socratic
method provides a foundation for teaching the law of privacy, but
casebooks alone are inadequate to prepare law students to answer the
privacy questions created by rapidly changing technology.
Part II of this Article provides a history of teaching privacy to law
students. Part III considers which teaching methods are best suited to
teaching privacy to today’s law students and concludes that the optimal
method is the case/Socratic method combined with structured class
discussion. Part IV considers the characteristics of modern law students,
summarizes the relevant facts of Nadya Suleman’s conception and
delivery of octuplets, and combines a respected casebook’s presentation
of relevant legal rulings with the Authors’ four guideposts for classroom
discussion.
It demonstrates how incorporating structured class
discussion of case law creates the most effective means of teaching law
students how to analyze the questions raised by the intersection of
technology and individual privacy rights.

See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY xi (1995) (“apprehension about invasion of privacy . . . and public concern
prompt legislative inquiries and the introduction of legislation”).
5
See THEODOOR H. VAN DE VELDE, FERTILITY AND STERILITY IN MARRIAGE 65–68 (2006)
(discussing excessive reproduction and the need to bring the issue to the attention of
legislators).
4
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II. A HISTORY OF TEACHING THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The first step toward presenting privacy law was discussion-based
classes on the law and issues of gender difference.6 These first classes
were seminars at the margin of core law classes primarily utilizing
articles, essays, literature, and reading lists as the textbooks.7 Employing
methods strikingly similar to the combination method endorsed by the
Authors of this Article, these classes were designed to present law
students with questions that require them to think outside traditional
legal analysis.8
One of the first textbooks on gender and the law was Sex
Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies by Barbara Allen
Babcock, Anne E. Freeman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Susan Deller
Ross, published in 1975.9 This textbook was based on material from a
handout generated for one of the first conferences on this subject entitled
Women and the Law held in 1971.10 This packet suggested a reading list
for these first feminist legal scholars as a way to initiate discussion.11 As
this early textbook illustrates, feminist activities focused on legal issues
began with the campaign for women’s legal rights, including the right to
contract, property rights, and women’s suffrage in the late 1800s and the
early 1900s.12 As the women’s movement for legal rights experienced
success, the agenda encompassed broader legal issues and social equality
for women. These early scholars on feminism and the law focused on
the issues presented by sex discrimination practices, which included
attempts to regulate sexual activity by state legislatures and courts.13 In
fact, it was the attempt to regulate sexual conduct through access to
contraception that ushered in the new era of what modern educators
teach as the right to privacy.14

6
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY ix
(Rowman & Littlefield 1988).
7
See Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 429, 430
(2002) (giving a more thorough analysis of the discussion classes related to the law and
issues of gender difference).
8
Id.
9
See id. at 430 (citing generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, ANN E. FREEDMAN, ELEANOR
NORTON, & SUSAN DELLER ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES
(1975)).
10
See id. at 431 (citing generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975)).
11
Id. at 430.
12
See id. at 431–33.
13
See id. at 434–37.
14
Christine Intromasso, Note, Reproductive Self-Determination in the Third Circuit: The
Statutory Proscription of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims as an Unconstitutional
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The 1965 United States Supreme Court opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut15 announced the concept of “zones of privacy” and became
the foundation for a new line of case law.16 As later courts began to
incorporate the issue of “zones of privacy” and the boundaries between
private-public domains were expanded and defined, so too did the study
of sexuality, gender, and the law.17 New cases then filled the pages of
casebooks for what is now taught as the law of privacy. However, as
cases were decided in these areas, seminar classes transitioned into more
traditional law school classes because teachers were able to utilize
traditional case law analysis to teach the subject. Naturally, casebooks
then became necessary.18 Next, casebooks covering gender became
larger, and sections of those texts discussing reproductive rights and
other topics evolved into independent courses.19
III. TEACHING METHODS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO TEACHING
THE MODERN INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
Traditionally, privacy law was about insulated, personal rights and
when those rights were protected from government interference.20
Reading judicial opinions organized into casebooks is currently the most
widely used method to teach law students the specific lines between
private and unprotected activities. Technology, however, is changing
the way in which people exercise their rights, and once-exact lines
delineated in these texts are much less clear today.21
Teaching privacy law exclusively from casebooks is simply
insufficient to teach law students how to thoroughly analyze issues at
the intersection of privacy and technology. Consequently, we must
modify the way we teach privacy. To find the best options for teaching
Violation of Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
101, 103–04 (2003).
15
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
16
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 6, at x.
17
See Kerber, supra note 7, at 437–38.
18
Id.
19
See id. at 431–35.
20
See Robert M. Bankey, Jr., Comment, Sound Rights: Legal Protections from Audio
Intrusions in Light of Directional Sound Technology, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 309, 339
(2008).
21
See Sabu M. George, Millions of Missing Girls: From Fetal Sexing to High Technology Sex
Selection in India, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 604, 605–08 (2006) (discussing how the advances
of assisted reproductive technologies and embryology have enabled selective implantation
of embryos of a desired sex and its greater implications on Indian society); see also Julie
Manning Magid et al., Radio Frequency Identification and Privacy Law: An Integrative
Approach, 46 AM. BUS. L.J., Spring 2009, at 4 (discussing radio frequency identification’s
impact on modern privacy law).
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this rapidly changing subject in the future, we turn to the main teaching
methods in use at American law schools.
There are four main teaching methods: case/Socratic, textbook and
lecture, problem, and simulation/role play.22 Because each method has
unique characteristics, some methods are more naturally suited to
certain kinds of subjects.23 However, while these methods are most often
thought of as separate, applying them in tandem is also a valid option.24
That is, in fact, what the Authors suggest in the following section, which
presents a primer on the pros and cons of each method in order to
demonstrate aspects of the methods properly suited to teaching privacy
law.
A. Case/Socratic Method25
The most recognized and utilized teaching method in modern law
schools is the case/Socratic method.26 In fact, it is so closely intertwined
with the profession that it is nearly synonymous with legal education.27
This discussion begins with the case/Socratic pedagogy because it
addresses the core teaching method of most law schools’ initial phase of
instruction.28
Functionally, the case/Socratic method is the simplest to employ.
First, casebooks illustrate the rules of law, allowing students to draw
upon those rules to form conclusions based upon hypothetical situations
posed by the professor.29 Second, the case/Socratic method may be used
in a large class, allowing the teacher control over the class and
discussion.30 Finally, the case/Socratic method is relatively easy for the
teacher to update through the addition of recent significant cases once
the initial materials have been collected.31
James Eagar, Comment, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical
Methods In Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389, 398 (1996–97).
23
Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law
Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1996).
24
Id.
25
See Eagar, supra note 22, at 399 (“The original purpose of the case method and
accompanying Socratic questioning . . . [is] to teach students how to ‘think like a lawyer.’”).
Consequently, the case and Socratic methods operate symbiotically. Id. For purposes of
this discussion, the methods used together will be referred to as the case/Socratic method.
26
See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 23 (2007).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 47.
29
Paul Bateman, Toward Diversity in Teaching Methods in Law Schools: Five Suggestions
from the Back Row, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 397, 414 (1997).
30
Id. at 403.
31
Eagar, supra note 22, at 403.
22
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Proponents of the case/Socratic method tout its ability to teach
students how to “think like a lawyer,” focusing on the analysis of legal
theory.32 The “critical tactic of the method is to seek continual
clarification of a proposition or definition by testing it with alternative
conflicting possibilities.”33
While the case/Socratic method has
remained entrenched in legal education and dominates law teaching, its
34
limitations are well documented.
Critics of the case/Socratic method argue that while it does teach
some of the skills needed by lawyers, using it exclusively neglects other
practical “lawyering” skills.35 When so much of a legal education is
based on a single pedagogy, it can create an imbalance by focusing on
the content of individual cases rather than the larger legal theory or
36
principle. Detractors of this method also claim that since participation
of the student is an essential feature of this method, the reality of class
size (law school classes are often quite large) and the resulting
diminished participation by each student greatly hinders its
effectiveness.37 Although the case/Socratic method sometimes is used to
demean or degrade students, it appears that the more abusive
interrogations have declined; however, it is recognized that this method
may hinder female participation in class discussion.38
The case/Socratic method has many strengths, but it also has many
weaknesses, particularly when used as an exclusive teaching method.
Some professors, like the Authors here, advocate supplementing the
method with other forms of active learning.39
Legal scholars who advocate moving away from the case/Socratic
method claim that by making legal learning more “realistic, concrete and
varied . . . the concepts are often made more understandable by
example.”40 These advocates claim that utilizing the case/Socratic
method is counter to many important strategies of effective teaching
because it is premised upon challenging every student response.41

Bateman, supra note 29, at 401.
Eagar, supra note 22, at 399 (quoting June Cicero, Piercing the Socratic Veil: Adding an
Active Learning Alternative in Legal Education, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1989)).
34
Friedland, supra note 23, at 28.
35
Eagar, supra note 22, at 400.
36
SULLIVAN ET. AL., supra note 26, at 51.
37
Eagar, supra note 22, at 401.
38
Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1547, 1554 (1993).
39
Eagar, supra note 22, at 403.
40
Sarah E. Thiemann, Beyond Guinier: A Critique of Legal Pedagogy, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 17, 34 (1998).
41
Id. at 21.
32
33
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Additionally, casebooks focus on the outcomes of cases, not on solving
42
specific problems.
Using the case/Socratic method alone seems particularly ineffective
in the context of teaching privacy in the modern age, especially when
considering how technology has impacted the exercise of those rights.
The story of Nadya Suleman presents just one example of how
technology has so altered an established practice that it effectively calls
personal rights into question in a way not contemplated by established
case law. Without more than Socratic questioning, students will not be
able to move beyond the rules of their casebooks.
B. Textbook and Lecture
As an alternative to the case/Socratic method, some scholars suggest
the textbook and lecture method, particularly during the second and
third years of law school.43 The concept of the textbook and lecture
method is fairly simple—textbooks are written to “systematize and
summarize course content, combined with problems.”44 The content of
the textbook is then discussed in a classroom setting.45
The case/Socratic method utilizes actual edited opinions from cases
and is premised on the idea of surprise and thinking on one’s feet.46 In
contrast, the textbook and lecture method provides and conveys the
material in a way that sets forth essential rules and is arguably similar to
the information in supplemental materials and commercial outlines often
purchased and used by students.47
Critics of the textbook and lecture method assert it is often
considered a dull method of teaching and is “probably the least effective
method in helping students to retain information and develop a practical
level of understanding.”48 Yet in the context of teaching privacy law, the
textbook and lecture methodology presents limitations similar to those of
the case/Socratic method. The inert nature of the textbook, which
simply summarizes and organizes course content, cannot address the
dynamic nature of this evolving area of law.

42
See John S. Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education: The Potential for Implementing the
Maccrate Report’s Recommendations for Curricular Reform, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 363, 384 (1994).
43
Eagar, supra note 22, at 403.
44
Id. at 409.
45
Id.
46
Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 241, 250 (1992).
47
Eagar, supra note 22, at 409.
48
Id. at 410.
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C. Problem Method
Another teaching method used in law schools is the problem
method. This method has three essential features. The first aspect is the
problem, which “involves several issues cutting across several cases and
statutes . . . and is meant to resemble a complex situation that a lawyer
might face in practice.”49 Regardless of whether the problem is framed
in the context of litigation, negotiations, drafting, or planning, the first
step is to develop a defined set of goals.50 Second, the student must
approach the problem from a “specified role, such as advocate, judge,
advisor, planner or similar role.”51 Third, “the problem is the focus of
the class discussion,” allowing the students to utilize cases, statutes, and
other tools to analyze the problem from the assigned perspective.52
Advocates of the problem method point to the benefits of having
students apply a full range of abstract principles.53 Proponents claim
that the problem method incorporates the advantages of the
case/Socratic method in terms of legal reasoning because it includes
issue recognition and analysis, decision-making, and identifying the
relationship between theory and practice.54 More importantly, advocates
assert that the problem method surpasses the case/Socratic method by
teaching students to ask relevant questions that lead to problem-solving
and actionable decisions.55 In other words, the problem method is
effective because it demonstrates to students that by asking the right
questions and applying pertinent data to new situations, they learn how
to find their own answers to legal problems, rather than by simply
reading how others found answers.56 Professors contend that the
problem method develops a greater student comfort level with both
57
statutory interpretation and case analysis. Consequently, the problem
method has been found to be particularly well-suited for code-oriented
courses.
When considering how to apply the problem method to teaching a
rapidly changing subject like privacy and technology, it is clear that the
presentation of a problem is created by the modern factual situation at
Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 250.
Michael P. Allen, Making Legal Education Relevant to Our Students One Step at a Time:
Using the Group Project to Teach Personal Jurisdiction in Civil Procedure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV.
133, 136 (2004).
51
Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 250.
52
Id.
53
Allen, Making Legal Education, supra note 50, at 139.
54
Eagar, supra note 22, at 404.
55
SULLIVAN ET. AL., supra note 26, at 199.
56
See Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 245.
57
Allen, Making Legal Education, supra note 50, at 145.
49
50
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issue. However, because constitutional rules of law cannot be stated
succinctly in a manner that allows immediate application to a limited
fact pattern, issues are not easily crafted into a neatly resolved problem.
That being said, the discussion element of the method can be an
invaluable tool if integrated into a lesson with case method.
D. Role Play/Simulation
A similar method used in law school classrooms is role
play/simulation.58 This method is used more extensively in clinical legal
education, but can be used effectively in the classroom.59 “The use of
simulation is based on the maxim that students learn best not [from]
what they hear or see, but [by] what they do.”60 Proponents of this
method claim it encourages creative thinking and active participation
while minimizing anxiety.61 Advocates claim that case simulations
integrate theory, doctrine, and practice—students use all of these skills
when they participate fully in the simulation, thereby gaining practical
training in creative problem solving, legal research, negotiation skills,
and litigation skills.62 In other words, this method is designed to train
professionals and is more similar to education paradigms utilized in
other professional schools such as medicine and business.63
Concerns about role play/simulation as a method arise in course
coverage and the ability of the class to cover the necessary content to
effectively teach the subject matter.64 For teaching privacy law, role
play/simulation is ineffective because the subject matter is complex and
students need basic knowledge of applicable law.
Without the
integration of the casebook method, particularly the study of seminal
cases establishing the right to privacy, students cannot understand the
evolution of the right from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman65 to
our modern conception.
E. An Alternative
Elements of the case/Socratic method combined with aspects of the
problem method and structured class discussion provide the best
combination of elements for teaching privacy in the context of rapidly
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Thiemann, supra note 40, at 35.
Eagar, supra note 22, at 407.
Id.
Thiemann, supra note 40, at 35–37.
Eagar, supra note 22, at 408–09.
Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 241.
Eagar, supra note 22, at 408.
See generally Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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advancing technology.
Additionally, certain considerations about
modern law students require this creative combination of teaching
methods.66 The guideposts set forth in Part IV demonstrate how the
application of these methods prepares law students to address modern
privacy issues, including how technology is redefining our personal
rights and changing the allocation of collective resources.
IV. TEACHING PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF OCTOMOM—A LESSON PLAN FOR
COMBINING ELEMENTS OF CASE / SOCRATIC METHOD WITH STRUCTURED
CLASS DISCUSSION
A. Return to the Roundtable
Early textbooks in the field of legal gender studies (and therefore
ultimately privacy) included not only cases, but also historical and
sociological materials and even magazine articles.67 Discussion and
integration using the problem solving method were necessary in the
early studies because this allowed scholars to theorize about issues of
equality and autonomy.68
Questions were numerous, and cases
answering them were few; students had no alternative to working
together to find solutions to problems. As cases worked their way
through the courts and the law developed, the teaching style in this
subject area changed as well.69 With more court opinions addressing
specific fact patterns and issues, the focus shifted away from discussion
of the large-scale issues to analysis of the decisions and dicta in the cases,
particularly as these lawsuits broke new ground and laid the foundation
for privacy rights.70 Feminist legal scholars began to scrutinize the
language of the cases in an attempt to discern the direction of trends in
the law.71 As these academics concentrated on the activities of the
women’s movement and the results of their litigation campaigns,
teaching moved away from theory and discussion to one of analyzing
social equality as legal demands.72
Just as it once was with women’s issues and the law, many
complicated issues of technology and privacy simply have not yet been
decided. At the beginning of this process, we lack answers and find it
See infra Part IV.B.
Kerber, supra note 7, at 434.
68
Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and Gender in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27,
44–45 (2006).
69
Id. at 45.
70
Id. at 45–50.
71
Id. at 51.
72
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Dorothy Roberts & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Race and Gender
in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27, 45 (2006).
66
67
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necessary to return to the roundtable, asking law students to think
creatively and to think ahead of the cases we know will soon populate
the pages of casebooks.
Understanding privacy as a legal concept is not a simple
undertaking. Some scholars have proposed teaching the law of personal
liberties as a separate Advanced Constitutional Law class, premised on
the idea that a student must first have some understanding of
constitutional law before undertaking study of privacy.73 To understand
privacy, students must understand due process, fundamental rights and
equal protection, and free expression.74 Learning at the roundtable
affords students the opportunity to more fully understand advanced
concepts and to move beyond the basics to apply the concepts to new
situations created by new technologies.
In contemplating the Nadya Suleman story, including the role
technology played in creating these issues, a return to the use of
discussion and thoughtful questioning as a tool of analysis provides a
dynamic and fluid device to consider this rapidly changing area.
Additionally, this method allows incorporation of other areas of privacy
rights.
B. Consider the Age and Experience of Modern Law Students
To effectively teach law students, professors must understand the
assumptions they bring to the analysis. Those assumptions condition
their willingness and ability to consider new theory. Some assumptions
may be false or inapplicable; some may require reexamination in light of
present circumstances. Modern American law students increasingly
subscribe to the widespread assumption that their bodies are their own
and therefore protected, whether as a “right to bodily integrity,” or a
“right to privacy,” or a “right to autonomy.”75 Of course, just because
modern law students “know” these truths does not mean they were
always so clear.
Roe v. Wade, “the watershed for both U.S. abortion rights and the
right to privacy,”76 is perhaps the most debated privacy case in America,
so understanding how modern law students understand Roe is essential
to effectively teaching privacy. The following discussion examines

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
xix (2d ed. 2004).
74
Id.
75
See Jonathan Herring & P.-L. Chau, My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies, 15 MED. L. REV.
34, 34 (2007).
76
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1218 (2001).
73
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implications of modern law students’ exposure to privacy issues,
particularly Roe.
1.

Consider the Students’ Age

More than half of law students today were born after 1985—twelve
or thirteen years after Roe was decided in 1973.77 They have never
experienced a world without the right of choice pronounced in Roe.
Stated another way, more than half of tomorrow’s lawyers have always
experienced the issue of abortion in terms of a choice, an opportunity
(whether morally right or wrong) guaranteed by a United States
Supreme Court that recognizes a right of privacy. Whether pro-choice or
pro-life, these future lawyers have never known a world in which
Americans did not have a certain zone of privacy that cannot, absent
certain circumstances, be disturbed by the state.78 Finally, and most
importantly, the limits on governmental interference with abortion (and
therefore citizens’ privacy) have been specifically defined by case law
that reinforces these students’ underlying assumption that certain
choices and activities are, at least at some points in time, free from
governmental interference.79
2.

Consider How the Students Have Debated Privacy Because that
Debate Shapes How They Approach and Perceive the Issue

The rhetoric law students heard as they matured shapes how they
approach privacy issues, so some attention to politicized debate is
necessary to properly teach modern law students about the intersection
of law and technology.
The world that modern law students “know” and their exposure to
abortion issues focuses primarily on rhetoric aimed to reframe Roe and to
make political and religious discussions out of the right to privacy.80 On
one side of the debate, pro-life advocates adhere to a principle of moral

77
Phil Handwerk, Analysis of Law School Applicants by Age Group, Law School
Admissions Council, Sept. 2007, http://members.lsac.org/Public/MainPage.aspx?
ReturnUrl=%2fPrivate%2fMainPage2.aspx.
78
M.N.S. Sellers, An Introduction to the Value of Autonomy in Law, 1 IUS GENTIUM 1, 8
(2007).
79
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80
Paige Nelson, Note, Let the People Speak: Terrorism, the Abortion Debate, and Reduction of
the Jury Award in Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 92 IOWA L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2007); Karen F.B. Gray, Comment, An Establishment
Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 399–400 (1990).
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opposition to abortion at any stage in gestation.81 They argue that all
human lives have unique value, regardless of the stage of development
or physical health.82 The claims are often based on religion and
encompass such arguments as the “Sanctity of Life Principle.”83 In
addition, pro-life advocates put forth several other arguments for moral
and religious opposition to abortion. These arguments include, but are
not limited to, “deprivation,” which argues that abortion deprives the
fetus of a valuable future.84 Others argue against “discrimination”—that
by allowing abortions, we unjustly discriminate against the unborn by
denying that fetuses have the same right to life as all, and thereby only
valuing some lives over others, but not all lives equally. They argue this
“valuation” is arbitrary, selective, and discriminatory.85 Additionally,
advocates of the pro-life position oppose abortion on the basis of
“personhood,” claiming that abortion is morally wrong because the fetus
is an innocent human being.86
Proponents claim these arguments provide a moral filter through
which abortion must be viewed, but they are essentially arguments that
the rights of the fetus should be afforded more consideration, requiring
reduction of the woman’s right to choose an abortion. Right to Life

81
John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s History and
Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 17 (2006) (citing JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA
34–35 (1978)). Professor Keown is a professor of Christian Ethics at Georgetown University
and Visiting Professor of Law, Jurisprudence, and Bioethics at the John Paul II Institute for
Marriage and Family, Melbourne, Australia. He is a noted author and scholar who has
written extensively on euthanasia and “quality of life” issues. His writings have been cited
in many United States Supreme Court decisions on cases involving the issues related to
abortion.
82
William Robert Johnston, Evaluation of the BGCT Christian Life Commission’s Abortion
and the Christian Life (2002), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/baptist/rptbgctc.html.
83
See John Coggon, Problems with Claims that Sanctity Leads to ‘Pro-Life’ Law, and Reasons
for Doubting it to be a Convincing Middle Way, 27 MED. & L. 203, 204–05 (March 2008); see also
John Keown, Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland, 113 L.Q. REP. 481,
482–503 (1997) (presenting a brief explanation of the principle in ethics and law).
84
See, e.g., Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 76 J. PHIL. 183, 189–93 (1989) (arguing
that individuals, including fetuses, who have “a future like ours,” have a right not to be
killed).
85
See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, HUMAN LIFE REV.,
Spring 1983, at 7, 10, available at http://www.humanlifereview.com/reagan (“[S]ocial
acceptance of abortion . . . embrace[s] a social ethic where some human lives are valued
and others are not. As a nation, we must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the
‘quality of life’ ethic.”).
86
See, e.g., Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 65–66 (1997) (anti-abortionists supported their claims of fetal personhood
by the fetus’s possession of a soul, and on its human characteristics).
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activists argue for firm moral opposition to the taking of life, defending
87
the value of human life as an absolute.
These ideals and ideas about family and the origins of human life are
couched in terms of concern for the unborn in arguments and legislation
often aimed at overturning Roe.88 As this movement has gained traction,
its impact on students must be considered, for it has influenced state
legislatures to adopt numerous measures to make it more difficult for
women to obtain abortions, including rules against minors obtaining
abortions without consent of their parents, waiting periods arguably
designed to discourage patients from carrying out their choice, refusal to
finance abortions with state funds, and limits on public hospitals’ ability
to provide abortion services.89 This balancing of privacy and an
individual’s zone of control are the exact arguments that will inform
debate over the issues in the Nadya Suleman story.
Pro-choice advocates argue that while all of these arguments are
premised on the idea that life is supreme, they ignore the reality that
resources are limited, including the resources to feed and care for each
additional life. Pro-choice advocates contend that the pro-life argument
incorrectly assumes that a woman’s “decision” to carry an unwanted
child to term has a limited impact on society and that unlimited
resources are available to care for that child.90 They contend that each
additional child impacts not only the immediate woman/family, but also
91
society as a whole, consuming scarce resources.

87
See, e.g., Coggon, supra note 83, at 204–05 (the doctrine of vitalism holds that life
should be preserved no matter what cost and how much suffering it may cause).
88
See Reagan, supra note 85.
89
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835, 837–39 (1992)
(upholding law requiring mandatory waiting periods, parental consent requirements, and
state-scripted counseling requirements); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding
federal regulations prohibiting family planning clinics from receiving Title X funds for
counseling or giving referrals to women regarding abortion); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Health,
497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute requiring minors to notify one parent or
obtain a judicial waiver); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (ruling
the state need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions, and upheld a law
restricting the use of public employees and facilities for abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519, 521 (1977) (holding that an indigent woman had no right to obtain a non-therapeutic
abortion at a publicly funded hospital).
90
See generally Carrie S. Klima, Unintended Pregnancy: Consequences and Solutions for a
Worldwide Problem, 43 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY, Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 483 (stating the need for
abortions and that unintended pregnancies and their substantial human and dollar costs
should be a priority for all countries).
91
Id. at 489 (discussing unintended pregnancy as a worldwide problem that affects
women, their families, and society).
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By understanding the rhetoric surrounding the most widely
discussed privacy case, we begin to understand how law students
approach the right to privacy.
C. Use a Reliable Casebook to Teach the Current State of the Law
Before students can be asked to apply principles of privacy law to
novel situations created by technological advances, they must
understand the current state of privacy law as well as its historical
development. Casebooks are the best tools for presenting these facts, but
most casebooks teach privacy as a series of rules for when the
government can interfere with an individual’s right to make certain
choices. They address only the first step of analysis necessary to
comprehend the issues at play in complicated fact patterns like those of
the Nadya Suleman story. Therefore, we suggest utilizing a reliable
casebook to teach students the current state of the law of privacy and
how it evolved to ensure a proper foundation for the discussion
suggested in Part IV.D.
Catharine MacKinnon’s casebook Sex Equality is highly regarded. Its
analysis is an example of how a casebook that thoroughly covers a
subject area lays a foundation for examining the intersection of privacy
and technology.92 What we refer to as the right to privacy was, of course,
ultimately defined in the context of abortion in Roe v. Wade.93
Discussing the development of the constitutional status of the right
to privacy, Professor MacKinnon explains that “the first judicial step” in
developing the right’s foundation in substantive due process was Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman94 In Ullman, the Court found a
challenge to a state’s criminal law proscribing obtaining and using
contraceptives was unripe because it had not been enforced against the
plaintiffs.95 MacKinnon explains:
Justice Harlan dissented in terms that became
formative, concluding that ‘a statute making it a criminal
offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the
conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual’s
personal life.’ Building on a previous Fourteenth
MACKINNON, supra note 76.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1086 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
95
Ullman, 367 U.S. at 523 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (cited in MACKINNON, supra note 76, at
1086).
92
93
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Amendment case forbidding involuntary sterilization of
prisoners convicted of some crimes but not others, he
envisioned in the ‘larger context’ of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause a guarantee of
‘liberty’ that extended well beyond the procedural.96
Justice Harlan’s dissent is important because it frames the question
in terms of “consensual behavior having little or no direct impact on
others.”97 This succinct statement is what we come to understand about
privacy as ultimately described in Roe98—effectively it is the foundation
of how we now understand, and therefore teach, the modern right to
privacy.
Our current understanding of privacy is further illustrated by rules
we glean from the repeal of anti-contraception laws and the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.99 Specifically, in Griswold the
“Supreme Court discovered that ‘zones of privacy’ emanate[d] from
several guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”100 In quoting Griswold,
Professor MacKinnon suggests we accentuate the following:
This law…operates directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one
aspect of that relation…[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. [Cases
under the First, Fourth, fifth, and Ninth Amendments]
bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition here is a legitimate one. The present case . . .
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding
the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goal by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship.101

96
97
98
99
100
101
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MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1086 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1087 (quoting Ullman, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1217.
Id. at 1217 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86).
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The next step in defining the new right of privacy “discovered” in
Griswold came in the Court’s decisions in Stanley v. Georgia102 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird.103 As Professor MacKinnon points out:
Then [the Court] ruled in Stanley v. Georgia that a
state’s power to regulate obscenity “simply does not
extend to mere possession by the individual [of obscene
materials] in the privacy of his home,” and invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause a state law that gave
differential access to contraception to married and
unmarried people otherwise similarly situated. The
zenith of this line of authority was reached in Roe v.
Wade’s invalidation of a state criminal abortion law. In
Roe, the right to personal privacy, settled in the “liberty”
component of the Due Process Clause, was held “broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.”104
Professors teach law students that these post-Griswold cases striking
down state contraceptive laws essentially blazed a path to abortion
“choice” by setting up arguments based on the reasoning that if a
woman has the right to use contraceptives, but these contraceptives were
not available, or they were not effective to prevent pregnancy before the
fact, then abortion ought to be available after the fact.105
Professor MacKinnon again reinforces the lesson that privacy rights
are born in Roe and succinctly sums up the ultimate source for how we
understand and teach modern privacy when she states:
[T]he watershed for both U.S. abortion rights and
the right to privacy is the Supreme Court ruling in Roe v.
Wade, in which the Court held the right to choose
abortion is a “liberty” protected in its “privacy” from
unwarranted governmental intrusion by the substantive
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Striking down Texas’s criminal abortion law, Roe also
held that the state had no compelling interest in
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
104
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1088 (citations omitted).
105
On the pro-choice movement, see generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN
THE STATES (2001); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991).
102
103
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legislating to preserve fetal life until after viability, and
that the fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.106
Roe stands for the rule that while it is necessary to consider the
impact on others when we exercise our liberties (the right to abortion in
this case), those “others” must be parties within the state’s protection.107
Until a fetus is viable, it is deemed not within the state’s protection, and
the state cannot interfere with the mother’s rights.108 Generally, we may
exercise our rights without hurting others; because the fetus is not a
“someone else,” women can exercise their rights without the state’s
109
interference.
Professors teach the simple rule that when dealing with government
interference in decisions concerning our private bodies, the rights of the
individual trump the government’s interest.110 The idea that a woman is
the ultimate master of her own body and personal space is underscored
in cases involving the rights of the father of a fetus who claims he has a
right to notice, a right to an opinion regarding the choice of abortion, or
an option to raise the child himself.111
For example, Professor
MacKinnon instructs that in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth112 “the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state cannot
constitutionally give husbands a veto power over their wives’ first
trimester abortion decision because the state does not itself have this
power.”113
Professor MacKinnon’s analysis of the import of Roe, and the lesson’s
pertinence to discussions of the Suleman facts, is not unique. In fact,
most texts teach modern law students the cases in a similar manner. The
casebook authored by William Eskridge, Jr. and Nan Hunter, entitled
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1218 (citations omitted).
See Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws: The Facts, What Can Be Done to Jump-Start
Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 239 (2008) (stating
that the liberal philosophy of helmet regulation is that riding without a helmet does not
affect others and thus belongs in the “private, unregulated sphere”); James Griffin, The
Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697, 706 (2007) (“For instance, it is the form of
John Stuart Mill's principle of liberty: freedom of action unless harm to others.”).
108
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
109
ROBERT H. BLANK, MOTHER AND FETUS: CHANGING NOTIONS OF MATERNAL
RESPONSIBILITY 99–100 (1992).
110
See Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans: Why the Constitution Is Not
Silent on Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 189 (2009).
111
See Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to be a Legal Father: Gonzales v. Carhart
and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 141, 142–44 (2008).
112
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
113
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1225 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70).
106
107
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Sexuality, Gender, and the Law, presents Roe similarly, noting that it
recognized a “fundamental right” of a woman to choose what and how
her body is used.114 Citing the argument of Roe’s attorney Sarah
Weddington that “because pregnancy to a woman is one of the most
determinative aspects of her life, it is of fundamental importance that she
have the freedom to terminate it.”115 Similarly, in Mary Jo Frug’s Women
and the Law, editors Judith Greenberg, Martha Minow, and Dorothy
Roberts present Roe in the context that an individual’s body, for both
men and women, is the foundation of one’s personhood, an important
source of self-knowledge, and as an important boundary between
themselves and others.116 Additionally, the editors discuss cases that
present legal reform efforts post-Roe, premised on the claim that women
should have more control of their own bodies.117 In Gender and Law and
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, Katharine Bartlett, with Deborah
Rhode and Martha Chamallas, respectively, follows MacKinnon’s
approach by teaching privacy law as a personal right to be protected
from government intrusion.118
These excellent casebook presentations of the current lines of privacy
law cannot alone answer the questions raised by the Suleman facts
because these facts could not have been anticipated. However, that
means only that the texts must be supplemented in order to address the
impact of technology on privacy.
To be clear, we do not suggest that a casebook author should be
expected to anticipate all such future questions, and it is not practical to
suggest casebooks be repeatedly revised to attempt to specifically ask the
questions necessary to teach students to think beyond the current law.
We do suggest, however, that legal education can present the rules of
case law in a way that welcomes unanswered questions.
The remainder of this Article presents four guideposts to frame a
discussion of any modern issue of the intersection of technology and
privacy. The Nadya Suleman example is used to demonstrate the
application of the guideposts for enhancing traditional case/Socratic
teaching of the rules of law set forth in the preceding discussion.

See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 73, at 30–31.
Id. at 30.
116
JUDITH G. GREENBERG ET AL., WOMEN AND THE LAW 649 (3d ed. 2004).
117
Id. at 649–51.
118
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 852–54 (4th ed. 2006); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 45–53 (2d ed. 2003).
114
115
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D. Four Guideposts for Classroom Discussion
With history as our best example, we see that when questions of
personal liberties are emerging faster than case law can answer them, the
discussion roundtable provides the framework necessary to study those
issues.119 We offer four guideposts for discussion as a framework for
teaching law students how to examine the intersection of privacy and
technology. Although not intended to be exhaustive, these guideposts
can build on an understanding of the law achieved through
case/Socratic method and should produce thoughtful discussion that
will prepare law students to solve tomorrow’s privacy dilemmas.
1.

Identify the Facts and the Role Technology Played in Creating the
Situation

Students should begin with a summary of the relevant facts. By way
of example, a summary of the Nadya Suleman facts follows.
After in vitro fertilization, thirty-three-year-old
divorced and single mother Nadya Suleman gave birth
to eight children on January 26, 2009 in Bellflower,
California.120 She already had six children, ranging in
age from two to seven. All fourteen of her children were
conceived through in vitro fertilization, the last eight
using remaining embryos from the previous in vitro
procedure.121 A team of 46 doctors, nurses and surgical
assistants, stationed in four delivery rooms at the
Bellflower Medical Center in California, delivered the
infants.122 She gave birth to two girls and six boys, who
joined her six other children.123
Medical experts
estimated the cost of delivering the infants and caring
for them until they are healthy enough to leave the
hospital at $1.5 million to $3 million.124

See supra Part II (discussing the structure and content of seminars on law, privacy, and
gender before a body of case law had developed).
120
Associated Press, California: And Babies Make 14, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A14.
121
Randal C. Archibold et al., Octuplets, 6 Siblings, and Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2009, at A14.
122
Dan Childs et al., Octuplets’ Mom: Can She Afford to Raise 14 Kids?, ABC News, Feb. 2,
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/WomensHealth/story?id=6774471&page=1.
123
Archibold et al., supra note 121.
124
MSNBC.com staff, Octuplets’ mom on food stamps, publicist says, NBC Today Show, Feb.
2, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29110391/from/ET/.
119
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This is not the first time that Ms. Suleman received
in vitro fertilization. Ms. Suleman had spent at least
$24,000 on her first in vitro fertilization procedure,
which resulted in the birth of her first four children.125
After receiving an inheritance from her aunt, Ms.
Suleman used an undisclosed amount to conceive twins
through in vitro fertilization.126 Frozen eggs left over
from the second pregnancy were used to conceive the
octuplets.127 In all, West Coast IVF in Beverly Hills,
California performed six in vitro fertilization procedures
on Ms. Suleman.128
In the last in vitro fertilization procedure, Ms.
Suleman’s doctor believed that only one or two embryos
would implant and grow. Instead, all six proved viable
and two of them split into twins, resulting in
octuplets.129 When Ms. Suleman learned she was
expecting multiple babies, doctors gave her the option of
selectively reducing the number of embryos, but she
declined.130 In a delivery by cesarean section that lasted
less than five minutes, doctors, who anticipated seven
children, were surprised to discover an eighth child.131
No law dictates how many embryos can be placed in
a mother’s womb.132 Even so, fertility doctors generally
follow guidelines that recommend doctors take account
of the mother’s physical and mental condition and home
life.133
As of the date of this writing, Ms. Suleman is
unemployed and is collecting $490 in food stamps per
125
Associated Press, Suleman Worked Hard for Those Babies, NBC Miami News, Apr. 10,
2009,
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/us_world/Suleman-Worked-Hard-for-thoseBabies.html.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Sharon Otterman, Mother of Octuplets Names Fertility Clinic, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG,
Feb. 9, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/octo-mom-names-fertilityclinic/?emc=eta1.
129
Mike Celizic, First look: Octuplet mom shows off babies, NBC Today Show, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29086126/from/ET/.
130
Jessica Garrison et al., Mother of octuplets already has twins, four other children, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/la-me-octuplets30-2009jan30,0,
6314319.story.
131
Id.
132
Associated Press, California Medical Board probes octuplet birth, NBC Today Show, Feb.
6, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29057426/from/ET/.
133
Id.
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week.134 Following an on-the-job injury in 1999, she has
collected more than $165,000 in state disability
payments.135 Although she is weighing book, television,
newspaper, and movie requests,136 she has also been
lambasted by talk-show hosts, fertility experts, and even
her own mother, whose hands are full caring for Ms.
Suleman’s other children.137
The first of the four guideposts for analysis is perhaps the most
literal. Students should be asked to list exhaustively the specific ways in
which technology has contributed to the fact pattern at issue.
Analyzing the Suleman fact pattern, technological advances create
and/or affect the following:
• The process of in-vitro fertilization;
• Implantation of multiple frozen embryos;
• Multiple embryos successfully implanting;
• Mother’s decision not to terminate any of the eight embryos
after successful implantation;
• Prenatal advances that allow term pregnancy of octuplets;
• Delivery of octuplets; and
• Healthcare advances in the care of multiples.
After identifying the specific roles technology played in creating the
facts of the situation, students should be encouraged to identify related
issues or questions.
2.

Consider Who Should Resolve the Issues Created by the Particular
Intersection of Technology and Privacy

Law professors usually direct students to case law to find answers to
legal issues. In the arena of privacy law, however, it is appropriate to
question whether the judicial branch is the branch best placed to answer
the questions posed. Students will consider who should resolve the issues
they identified after reviewing the facts.
Some authors have suggested that American courts “lack the
institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications of new
technologies they encounter.”138 Some assert that judges are not
Supra note 124.
Id.
136
Archibold et al., supra note 121.
137
Associated Press, Octuplets mom getting outrage rather than gifts, NBC Today Show, Feb.
3, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29002731/.
138
See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858 (2004).
134
135
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properly suited to define privacy when new technology is involved
because “[j]udicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they
cannot change quickly and cannot test various regulatory
approaches.”139
Beyond these arguments, serious constitutional
implications are involved in determining who should decide these
issues.
In their book Judicial Dictatorship, William J. Quirk and R. Randall
Bridwell remind us that law professors should be asking not only how
the Supreme Court might rule on a given fact pattern, but also whether
the Supreme Court should be answering the question at all.140 Professors
Quirk and Bridwell suggest:
The traditional view was that the separation of powers
made the legislature and executive responsible for
change and the Court the guardian of continuity and
stability. The Court, however, over the past thirty years,
has made itself the major agent for change—one that
operates without democratic check to accomplish ends
that could not be achieved by democratic process.141
Students should thoughtfully consider which branch of government
should determine the limits of privacy or, in the Suleman case, whether
any protection guarantees a woman’s right to conceive multiple children
with the assistance of medical technology. Questions to be considered
are: Is a profession or professional entity involved? Is that entity or
profession regulated by a state agency? Should that agency or the
legislature be defining the rights and roles?
If the courts should not answer the questions raised by the
intersection of privacy and technology, then who should?
Some argue that executive agencies are more appropriate to resolve
certain issues because they are more accountable to the people than are
federal judges.142 Applying this logic, students may wish to discuss
whether the health and health policy aspects of the Suleman example
suggest that executive agencies ought to regulate prospective mothers’

Id. at 859.
See generally WILLIAM J. QUIRK & R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP
(1995).
141
Id. at xv.
142
Glen Staszewski, Reason Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1261 (2009)
(“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is. . . .”); see also REGAN, supra note 4.
139
140
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fertility choices if those choices involve giving birth to multiple children.
If welfare funds and health services are involved, perhaps executive
agencies are best suited to regulate these matters.
Students should consider whether the legislative branch is the most
appropriate for resolving the rights to use technology to mother multiple
children. The legislative solution has often been rejected for privacy
issues because “it is difficult to conceptualize privacy, especially for
purposes of formulating policy.”143 Still others assert that the focus on
judicial protection of privacy ignores Congress’s success in defining and
protecting privacy.144 Considering all these views, students should be
asked how they might draft a law defining privacy relative to
technologically-assisted fertility and to identify the difficulties of
legislating in this area.
In resolving this debate, law professors should ask students to
consider additional factors, such as whether the mother’s need for
governmental assistance to raise children should make a difference in
access to medical technology by which the children are conceived, born,
and assisted in survival? Does this factor affect which body, if any,
should be defining permissible actions?
Although the debate likely will be resolved, like so many before, in
the courts, law students should examine which branch of government or
what body is best suited constitutionally to resolve the issues created by
a particular intersection of technology and privacy.145
3.

Assuming the Courts Will Resolve the Issues, Examine Cases That
Provide Insight and Explore Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation

Even realizing that case law does not provide the only source for
resolution of these issues and that other branches are arguably
143
REGAN, supra note 4, at 3 (“As a value, privacy is important, but as a goal for public
policy, privacy remains ambiguous.”).
144
Kerr, supra note 138, at 856.
145
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003) (stating the constitutional
protection afforded to personal decisions relating to marriage and procreation); see also Poe
v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D. Kan. 1972). The court stated:
Even though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, an
individual has long been recognized to have retained his right to
individual autonomy and privacy and that this right carries over into
the marital relationship. Consequently, the Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of a right to care for one's own health, to
personal autonomy, to marry, to have offspring, to use contraceptives,
to direct the upbringing and education of one's children, as well as the
right to travel.
Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
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empowered to decide the issues, students must understand that case law
continues to guide the resolution of such issues.146 Unless there is a
major shift, American courts will continue to resolve these issues of
privacy. 147 Therefore, students need to identify specific cases or lines of
cases that provide insight to analysis of the issue and to understand why
the cases were decided as they were. This demonstrates the necessity of
using the traditional casebook teaching method in conjunction with the
roundtable discussion.
Professors have traditionally taught law students that:
[Roe v. Wade] held the right to choose abortion is a
“liberty” protected in its “privacy” from unwarranted
governmental intrusion by the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. Striking
down Texas’s criminal abortion law, Roe also held that
the state had no compelling interest in legislating to
preserve fetal life until after viability.148
If this constitutional analysis is applied to situations like the Suleman
scenario, law students will have to answer whether the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects a
woman’s right to conceive multiple children with the assistance of
technology. If the state has no compelling interest in legislating to
preserve fetal life, can it legislate to prevent conception of life or lives
through medical assistance? Does it make any difference if the mother
intends to conceive a single or multiple babies?
In deciding Roe and other cases like Danforth, the Court was not
considering the facts students will be examining in this current exercise.
Arguably, the Court could not have imagined the opinion in Roe being
used to dissect a fact pattern involving the conception and birth of eight
babies. Considering the technological advances at play here, one might
ask whether the Court could have dreamed of the current process of in
vitro fertilization, prenatal care that permits term pregnancy of octuplets,
and neonatal care sufficient to allow multiple tiny babies to survive. It is
not a new or simple question how to apply case precedent to decide later
issues involving facts not remotely within the consideration of the
original Court.

146

ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: CASES LOST AND CAUSES WON BEFORE
195 (2006).
Id.
MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1218 (citation omitted).

THE SUPREME COURT
147
148
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Two major theories—Originalism and the Living Constitution—seek
to resolve this dispute over how to factor change into constitutional
interpretation. Students should be exposed to both theories.
Originalism asserts that:
[w]hen the original Constitution was ratified, and when
amendments were added to it over the course of years, a
particular meaning was enacted, and judges are not
given the authority to change that meaning. The role of a
judge is to say what the Constitution does mean, not
what it ought to mean; if change is needed, Article V sets
out the procedure by which it can be amended.
Allowing judges to have free rein to change the meaning
of the Constitution to suit the perceived needs of the day
takes sovereignty away from the American people and
places it in the hands of an unelected judiciary.
Adherence to original understanding, by contrast,
prevents judges from imposing their own values.
Originalists thus argue that constitutional cases should
be decided according to our best guess as to how the
ratifiers would have decided them. Judges should
protect a right to abortion only if the ratifiers would
have agreed that it existed. . . . Anything else,
originalists say, is illegitimate (or even “activist”).
The standard argument for the living Constitution
focuses on the fact that conditions and attitudes have
changed greatly since the framers’ times. Living
constitutionalists argue that the Constitution must be
able to adapt to respond to current needs and problems
rather than remaining frozen in time. Because the
amendment process is so difficult and cumbersome,
requiring a two-thirds majority in both the House and
the Senate and then ratification by the legislatures of
three-quarters of the states, living constitutionalists seem
to view judicial modification of the Constitution with
equanimity—a necessary evil, at the worst. Without
judicial changes, they say, states would still be allowed
to segregate schools, ban interracial marriage, and
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exclude women from the practice of law, to give just a
few prominent examples.149
In his article Abortion and Original Meaning, Jack M. Balkin writes that
when contemplating the constitutional basis for the decision in Roe, the
“choice between original meaning and living constitutionalism is a false
choice,” and he suggests an alternative approach.150 Balkin first
considers the critics of Roe who deride the decision under the theory of
Orginalism, claiming that the “right of privacy” is not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.151 These critics claim there is no
constitutional basis as contemplated by the Framers and adopters of the
Constitution for protection of a privacy right for a woman’s choice to
have an abortion.152 In comparison, Balkin notes that the Living
Constitution theory is rooted in the incorrect premise that interpretation
based on original meaning will leave our Constitution inflexible and
unable to meet the challenges brought on by a changing society as well
as technology.153
Balkin urges that both of these criticisms are wrong and offers a
third option—that Roe is based on the “constitutional text of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the principles that underlie it.”154 He
distinguishes between an analysis of the decision based on the original
meaning of the constitutional text versus one based on original expected
application.155
Under Balkin’s interpretation of original expected
meaning, he argues that even though the Framers did not expect or
intend the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to abortion, they
nonetheless intended that principles of equal protection and prohibition
against class legislation that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment would
support “anti-subordination” of one person’s rights over another’s and
therefore a right to privacy.156
Balkin rejects the assumption that faithfulness to the text means
faithfulness to the original expected application.157 Rather, he argues,
“constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of
the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text.”158 In other
149
Kermit Roosevelt, Originalism and the Living Constitution: Reconciliation, ACS Issue
Brief, July 8, 2007, http://www.acslaw.org/node/5111.
150
Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007).
151
Id. at 291.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 293.
154
Id. at 292.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 293.
158
Id.
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words, Balkin claims that interpretation should look to original meaning
and underlying principles and decide how best to apply them in current
circumstances. 159 He calls this approach “text and principle.”160
Whether we conclude Professor Balkin is correct, or not, this
problem of changing circumstances, created by technological advances,
is what makes the contemplation of different theories of constitutional
interpretation so important. Asking students to consider how they view
the Constitution and how that view affects the application to changing
fact patterns furnishes them additional tools to deal with the changing
way we exercise privacy rights.
Additionally, applying Balkin’s “text and principle” theory becomes
particularly challenging when applying the theory to the Suleman facts.
Balkin’s argument—that the right of privacy is founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment principle of anti-subordination of one person’s
choice to another person’s choice—produces new and unique questions
when these choices create overlapping zones of privacy. Students
should ponder whether Balkin’s emphasis on “plasticity, contestability
or fluidity of underlying principles” may result in inconsistent
interpretations when circumstances change.161 In situations such as
Nadya Suleman’s choice to utilize technology, we encounter the issue of
whose choice should prevail when choices conflict? How should a court
reconcile these rights? What considerations are relevant?
Discussing these two major schools of interpretation along with
ideas like Balkin’s variation will prompt students to think about how
they view the Constitution. They should be encouraged to think about
how to interpret the document, what that means to the issue at hand,
and what their own philosophy of interpretation will be.
4.

Address the Implications for Allocation of Resources

In reviewing the Suleman facts, not only will the advances in
medical technology that allowed conception and viable birth of these
babies be important, but so will the costs to society of allowing the birth
of these children; some of those costs are social but most often they will
be calculated in terms of economic cost to the state and to others.162 In
addition to new debates over the right to conceive and to give birth,163
Suleman’s delivery of octuplets has led many to ask what right, if any,
Id.
Id.
161
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 388 (2007).
162
Edmondson, supra note 3.
163
Archibold et al, supra note 121.
159
160
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such a mother has to expect the assistance of state funds to assist her in
caring for her children.164
Therefore, in addition to addressing
technology’s creation of new factual scenarios, students must be
encouraged to factor the role of limited resources into the equation.
The allocation of resources—that is, balancing needs and resources—
is not a new analysis to law. In fact, Professors Emma Coleman Jordan
and Angela P. Harris have compiled an entire textbook to help students
examine these important issues. In Economic Justice, Professors Jordan
and Harris focus on engaging students in understanding both economics
and social justice.165 Professors Jordan and Harris observe that the
United States constitutional structure protects some rights—political and
civil rights—but not others, namely social and economic rights.166 In
other words, the constitutional law is defined as protecting citizens from
abuse of government power, but does not require the government to
provide its citizens with anything.167
Given scarce economic resources and with increasing numbers of
Americans dependent on government economic assistance, disputes over
an individual’s consumption of resources through the exercise of
personal rights are inevitable. The consumption of resources is perhaps
the most striking example of modern conflict resulting from technology’s
narrowing of the space between an individual’s choice and the impact of
that choice on others.
To address the interplay of economics and privacy in the Suleman
factual scenario, students should look to instances where the Supreme
Court has recognized limitations, particularly in allocation of scarce
resources. Examples of this include Harris v. McRae, in which the
Supreme Court decided that freedom of personal choice does not require
federal Medicaid programs to fund medically necessary abortions.168
Rather, the Court said that “the freedom of a woman to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy” was guaranteed.169 Harris marked the
Court’s attempt to circumscribe the constitutionally guaranteed freedom
and subordinate it to the specific social goals and allocations.170 In other
words, Harris recognized a woman’s right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy, while also denying any obligation on the state to expend
164
See Associated Press, Octuplet Family Financial Burden May Fall on Taxpayers,
FOXNews.com, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,491204,00.html.
165
EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER,
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS vi (2005).
166
Id. at 87.
167
Id.
168
448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980).
169
Id. at 316.
170
Id. at 326–27.
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limited resources to pay for it—in effect, a barrier to carrying out her
choice.171 Do the Suleman facts suggest a different conclusion?
Students may also wish to consider C.K. v. Shalala.172 In this decision,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a so-called “family cap”
provision, which eliminated the standard increase in welfare funding
provided for additional children born to an individual currently
receiving welfare funding.173 Claiming that the “family cap” was not an
example of the state’s attempt to influence the behavior of men and
women, the court found that the cap merely imposes a ceiling on benefits
accorded through welfare funding, permitting any additional children to
share in that “capped” family income. The court also held that the cap
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.174
Further, the court stated that “it is well-settled that decisions about
family composition, conception, and childbirth fall into a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy.”175 A state may not hinder an individual’s
exercise of protected choices; however, the state is not obligated to
remove obstacles that it did not create, including lack of financial
resources.176
For thirty years now we have understood that a woman’s right to
make choices about her body, as recognized in Roe, is a constitutionally
protected right of privacy within certain limitations.177 With the advent
of reproductive technology unforeseen when Roe was decided, we now
must debate further questions: Does the right to privacy guarantee a
woman the right to employ reproductive technology to bear multiple
children, anticipating that the state will bear some of the cost of care for
the children? If Roe is the best source for defining a woman’s right not to
have children, is it the starting point to answer whether a woman has a
right to have a child (or many children) supported by welfare funds?
Tomorrow’s legal scholars will have to answer the question whether the
extraordinary fact that Nadya Suleman conceived multiple fetuses with
technological assistance, and/or in anticipation of state support, should
play any role in defining those fetuses’ right to exist (as distinct from the
single conventionally conceived fetus at issue in Roe). Is the ability of
these children to contribute back to society a factor when deciding the
Id. at 316–17.
C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom. C.K. v. New Jersey Dept.
of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996).
173
Id. at 1015.
174
Id. at 1013.
175
Id. at 1014.
176
Id.
177
Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 255, 280 (1992).
171
172
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allocation of finite resources? And, again, which branch of government
should answer these questions?
Our previous understanding of the delineation between zones of
privacy and the allocation of limited resources is premised upon certain
known truths, that is to say, that multiple births are rare and occur
randomly. However, it is now possible for a welfare mother of six to
employ technology in order to conceive an additional eight children and
then present them to the state for support.178 Technology and the
allocation of scarce resources have collided; tomorrow’s lawyers will
have to clean up the debris.
V. CONCLUSION
Every day, individuals like Nadya Suleman make private decisions
that will affect indefinable numbers of people both now and in the
future. Disputes will be brought to governors, legislators, and judges,
with requests for new rules about how and where one is guaranteed
freedom to exercise private rights. The concept of privacy from Griswold,
Roe, and their progeny will necessarily evolve, and these cases will frame
new debates seeking answers to questions raised by the intersection of
privacy and technology. Specifically, who decides and who pays?
Tomorrow’s lawyers will be called upon to debate where private
rights end, where the state’s right to preserve resources begins, and
which branch of government should draw the lines between the two. In
order to prepare law students to participate in this process, law
professors must look for new ways to teach law students how to frame
the issues. Having explored the facts of the Nadya Suleman story by
way of example and having presented an instruction format of four
guideposts for structured class discussion, we call for a return to the
seminar roundtable.

178

Childs et al., supra note 122.
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